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The course of the Russian-Ukrainian war

ANALYSIS OF THE WEEK'S TOPIC: Russia's military campaign plans for 2024.

Almost two years have passed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The year of 2024 should be a new stage on the path to Ukraine's victory. But there will be plenty of threats and challenges. Moscow continues to do everything possible to achieve its ambitions.

Russia has no intention of ending the war it started. Vladimir Putin's teleconference on 14 December suggested that Russia will continue to fight until it achieves all its goals. While the dictator expectedly blamed Ukraine for his actions, in particular Kyiv's refusal to carry out "denazification".

But one thing is for sure, the lack of an adequate assessment of its own actions and ambitions is what determines that Kremlin will go all the way. In response to Putin's requests during an expanded meeting on 19 December, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that Russian troops would continue fighting in Ukraine and would carry out "all the tasks" set by their president.

However, they have already had to give up some ambitions. For example, it was planned that the Russian army would be able to capture Avdiivka before Putin's New Year's speech. However, they failed to do so. Right now, fierce fighting is still going on in the city, with the Russian side suffering heavy losses.

"We are currently losing 200 to 600 soldiers a day near Avdiivka, and many of them are seriously wounded. Imagine if we intensify the assaults. In addition, the mobilised soldiers are now fighting worse," some Russian military officers described last year's Russian appetites in these words. [1]

Such human losses are a big problem for Russia. It is constantly trying to embellish the real situation. Thus, Putin continues to make statements that are far from reality. He said that the Russian armed forces are "improving their position" along the entire front line and added that the front line under Russian control is 2,000 kilometres. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defence said that it had fulfilled "all the goals set" for 2023.

Vladimir Putin also addressed the issue of personnel, saying that there are 617,000 Russian soldiers at the front in Ukraine. He noted that at the beginning of 2023, 486,000 people were "recruited" into the Russian army.  Obviously, such a number does not allow Russia to achieve the objectives of the offensive, due to the huge losses incurred by Russian troops in its conduct. Therefore, it seems that Russia is trying to quickly fill its gaps in the high mortality rate of soldiers. For example, at the end of last year, Sergei Shoigu announced his intention to increase the number of Russian military personnel to 1.5 million. According to him, this decision was due to "growing external threats" to Russia, including Finland's accession to NATO and preparations for the approval of Sweden's future accession. Experts believe that this step may indicate the launch of a new wave of mobilisation in Russia, especially after the presidential election in 2024.

However, in an interview with RBC-Ukraine, Vadym Skibitskyi, head of the Defence Ministry's Main Intelligence Directorate, said that it is not necessary to expect a direct announcement of mobilisation. Rather, Russia will try to gradually recruit new soldiers every day:" They have created all the conditions for mobilisation activities, including at the legislative level. There is a register of persons liable for military service. There are also plans to form and restore, for example, the Leningrad and Moscow military districts. And all this will affect the mobilisation needs of their armed forces... Every day, about 1,000-1,100 people join the ranks of the Russian armed forces. Let's put it this way: they are mobilising. It's just not as massive as it was in October-December 2022. "  [2]

He also said that in 2024, Russian troops plan to continue their attempts to reach the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, a strategic objective set on 17 April 2022. An additional important goal for the invaders is to reach the Oskil River, eliminate the Robotynsky Ledge and the area where the Armed Forces operate within the left bank of the Kherson region.

However, some foreign publications predict Russia's appetites and goals are much greater. According to BILD, Russia plans to seize large parts of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro and Kharkiv regions, including the city of Kharkiv, in 2025-2026. And the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) suggests that Russia is preparing false arguments to justify future aggression against NATO member states.[3]

 Expert Colonel Serhiy Grabsky, a reserve colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, is convinced that such plans exist, although they may be only interim options considered by the enemy. He notes that the implementation of such plans will require enormous efforts and resources, and doubts that Russia has sufficient capabilities to carry out such actions in the future. The expert emphasises that this could be aimed at unbalancing the coalition of states that support Ukraine.

Russia's unwillingness to expand the front line can also be seen in its enormous desire to restore and replenish military supplies, which are clearly lacking. Thus, in the summer of 2022, Moscow adopted laws and government decrees that effectively switched defence-industrial enterprises to wartime mode. The working week was extended, and some companies switched to three-month shifts. However, this does not guarantee that they will fully cope with the challenges of the defence industry.

The main focus is now on restoring equipment damaged on the battlefield and producing new weapons, including artillery systems, armoured vehicles and other military equipment. According to intelligence reports, the manufactured weapons are immediately sent to the frontline against Ukraine.

However, there are indications that Russia may lack its own ammunition, as evidenced by purchases from other countries, such as Iran and North Korea, and exports from warehouses in Belarus. It is also pointed out that production does not meet the needs of the Russian armed forces. For example, Russian enterprises produced only about 2 million 122-mm and 152-mm artillery rounds in 2023, which is not enough for the army's needs. Russia also wants to receive weapons from China or Central Asian countries.

As for the shelling of Ukraine and the threat from the sky, since the beginning of December, Russia has launched massive missile attacks on Ukraine, but its targets are not limited to energy facilities, as they were in previous periods. By circumventing sanctions and receiving support from third countries, Moscow is able to continue producing long-range missiles and increase production of attack drones such as the Shahid.

To date, the Russian Federation's main efforts have been focused on destroying Ukraine's infrastructure, including defence industry facilities, headquarters, command and control systems, and individual units located on the front line.

As for the accuracy of the strikes, the Russian Federation uses various types of weapons, including Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. However, these strikes can be inaccurate, which is why they often result in civilian casualties.

The Russian Federation has prioritised the destruction of air defence systems, aviation and defence industry facilities as a means of countering the build-up and strengthening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. All the necessary conditions for mobilisation measures have been created, including legislative grounds. There are plans to form and restore military districts, such as Leningrad and Moscow. The army is regularly replenished with new conscripts, about 1,000-1,100 people a day.

From this we can conclude that Russia is not slowing down its ambitions, but is furious at its inability to realise them quickly. That is why it will resort to radical actions and provocations. The year 2024 is indeed a turning point, when Russia has a chance to build up its power to satisfy its bloodthirsty appetites. Therefore, Ukraine should be prepared for a fierce defence, especially in the first half of the year. In addition, it should maintain a tough, uncompromising stance.  Negotiations, despite their nature, provide Russia with an opportunity to restore its military capabilities, build up its forces and create strategic reserves to continue its aggression.

It should also be remembered that Russia is looking for and successfully finding ways to circumvent sanctions and gain new allies. That is why Ukrainian partners should not delay too much in providing assistance, as they are still a potential target for Russia.

 

 

 

Changes at the frontline:

 Trend: Despite the critical shortage of ammunition and personnel in the units, the Ukrainian Defence Forces continue to hold back a large-scale offensive by Russian troops along the entire frontline

 

In the Volyn, Polissia, Siversky and Slobozhansky directions, no signs of Russian offensive groups were detected.

In the Kupyansk direction, Russians fired at the settlements of Novomlynsk, Dvorichna, Zakhidne and Kindrashivka in the Kharkiv region.

In the Liman direction, Russians conducted unsuccessful offensive actions in the area north of Hryhorivka and near Spirne.

In the Bakhmut direction, Russians continues to conduct offensive actions. Fighting for the town of Bakhmut continues.

In the Avdiivka direction, Russians conducted offensive operations in the areas of Novokalynove, Severne, Vodiane, Pervomaiske and Nevelske, but were unsuccessful.

In the Maryinka direction, Ukrainian defenders repelled numerous enemy attacks near the town of Maryinka in the Donetsk region.

Military assistance:

The United States confirmed the provision of long-range precision ground-launched bombs (GLSDBs) to Ukraine.

France: transferred two LRU multiple launch rocket systems.

Germany: On 26 January, the German Ministry of Defence announced the military aid that Ukraine will receive in 2024. In particular, it was about Gepard anti-aircraft systems, new IRIS-T air defence systems and more than 80 Leopard 1A5 tanks. In total, in 2024, the country plans to allocate more than €7 billion worth of aid to Ukraine.

  • three WISENT 1 demining tanks;
  • four Bandvagn 206 tracked all-terrain vehicles;
  • missiles for IRIS-T SLS launchers;
  • a Beaver bridge-building tank;
  • 24 armoured personnel carriers;
  • 14 mine trawls;
  • four border protection vehicles;
  • a marine demining system;
  • Satcom surveillance system for satellite communications;
  • 1040 155 calibre shells;
  • 450 anti-slip chains.[4]
 

[1] [1] Наступ на фронті та цілі на 2024 рік: які заяви останнім часом лунають у Росії щодо війни в Україні. 20.12.2023 https://tsn.ua/exclusive/plani-putina-na-2024-schodo-viyni-2475235.html

[2] Вадим Скібіцький: У росіян є мотивація воювати за гроші, щодня до армії йде близько 1000-1100 осіб. 15.01.2024. https://gur.gov.ua/content/vadym-skibitskyi-u-rosiian-ie-motyvatsiia-voiuvaty-za-hroshi-shchodnia-do-armii-ide-blyzko-1000-1100-osib.html

[3] Росія готується до війни з НАТО: американські аналітики вказали на ознаки. 20.12.2023. https://tsn.ua/svit/rosiya-gotuyetsya-do-viyni-iz-nato-amerikanski-analitiki-vkazali-na-oznaki-2475571.html

[4] [4] https://zaxid.net/news/