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Source: Army FM  

  • Changes at the front


Russia's full-scale aggression continues for the seventh month and the hostilities are gradually approaching the winter period. With the approach of winter, both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian war will face a number of problems that push them to attempts aimed at affecting the development of events in the current war already today.

The Russian Federation and its citizens will increasingly feel the impact of sanctions on the economy. In the military dimension, Russia is not as well prepared as previously believed. First of all, Russian soldiers will lose even more morale. In harsh conditions, unequipped trenches and without suitable winter military clothing, Russian soldiers will suffer from diseases and frostbite. Given the level of equipment of the Russian army at the first stages of the war and as of now, Russia probably will not be able to equip its military in a proper way. The volunteer movement in Russia, compared to Ukraine, is frankly weak, and society, which will feel the consequences of sanctions more strongly, is unlikely to rally to help the Russian armed forces. Probably, the level of support of the so-called special operations will decrease, which will also have an impact on the morale of the military personnel of the occupying country. In the absence of progress due to weather conditions, demoralization awaits Russian soldiers. Also, according to The Insider, by the end of this year, the Russian Federation will face a shortage of ammunition and will be forced to limit the use of artillery.[1]

For Ukraine, the winter period also carries threats. Even if the EU passes the test in the winter period and maintains unity in its sanctions policy, it is worth remembering that economically Ukraine relies on foreign aid. Therefore, further resistance and functioning of the state depends on the will of the partners. In order to maintain faith in Ukraine's possible victory, and therefore further economic and military support, Ukraine will likely resort to attempts to demonstrate its ability to return territories by military means. On August 29, offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine began in several directions in the South of the country. It is still too early to talk about a counteroffensive of Ukrainian troops, however, successful actions aimed at improving the tactical position along the contact line may lay the groundwork for further effective combat operations aimed at returning control of the entire Right Bank and the city of Kherson.

Therefore, the Russian leadership will probably look for ways to conclude a truce in order to restore forces and renew aggression after a certain pause. Any respite in this war will be used by the Russian leadership to replenish reserves and make another attempt to occupy Ukraine. After all, the situation at the front is not in favor of Russia. In the second half of August, the Russian army did not make any significant progress. Ukrainian forces continued to shell enemy supply routes and key positions throughout the Kherson region in support of the counter-offensive launched in southern Ukraine. Russian troops carried out limited ground attacks northwest and northeast of Slovyansk, in the direction of Siversk, and northwest of Kharkiv. They had no success.

In the Avdiyivka direction, battles are being fought for the settlements of Pisky, Opytne, and there are attempts to surround Avdiyivka, but without success. Probably, in September, Russian troops will use reserves for an offensive in this direction with the aim of capturing the entire Donetsk region. According to information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russian troops received an order from the President of the Russian Federation to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk region by September 15.

In the Zaporizhzhya direction, the enemy is regrouping units and units of the 3rd Army Corps with the aim of resuming the offensive.


  • Military assistance


In the second half of August, Ukraine has received the following weapons:

From Latvia:

- self-propelled guns M109 (6 units)

From Estonia:

- 90-mm anti-tank guns "Pansarvärnspjäs 1110"

From Finland:

- Mortars 120 KRH 92

- Anti-aircraft guns "23 ItK 61"

Jordan (Probably)

- RPG-32 anti-tank grenade launchers (Unknown quantity)

From Great Britain:

- Ferret Mk 1 armored reconnaissance vehicle

- Snatch Land Rover armored jeeps (14 units)

- Patrol cars Vector Pinzgauer 718 (3 units)

- 6 underwater drones for demining the coastline

From Bulgaria:

- Mortars M60CMA

From USA:

- HARM anti-radiation missiles in the AGM-88B Block III version

Assistance of charitable and fundraising funds:

- Satellite, and access to the ICEYE satellite constellation database

- Mi-2 AM-1 helicopter

A number of military aid packages were also announced. The US package includes: additional ammunition for HIMARS multiple-launch systems; 75,000 155 mm artillery ammunition; 20 120 mm mortar systems and 20,000 120 mm mortar ammunition; Ammunition for the NASAMS surface-to-air missile system; 1,000 Javelin installations and hundreds of AT4 anti-armor systems; 50 armored medical vehicles; Claymore anti-personnel ammunition; S-4 explosive, ammunition and equipment for demolition of buildings; Medical supplies, including first aid kits and other equipment. 

The Estonian government intends to transfer mortars and anti-tank weapons. In addition, Estonia plans to support the training of Ukrainian servicemen. Norway and Britain will give Ukraine Black Hornet micro-drones and NightFighter anti-drone systems. Sweden will provide military support to Ukraine in the amount of 100 million dollars, which includes weapons requested by the Ukrainian government. It is not specified what positions Ukraine will receive.


  • Russia: internal and external challenges


The first summit of the Crimean Platform caused a stir in Russia. The initiative was criticized by almost all high-ranking officials of the occupying country, in particular, Dmitri Medvedev defiantly called it a "retard initiative", Lavrov called it a "Russophobic event" and a "coven", and Vladimir Putin declared that the platform was a provocative measure. This year, against the background of strikes on military facilities on the territory of the occupied peninsula, Russian high-ranking officials did not focus on the Crimean platform, and those who commented on the event were more restrained than last year. Dmitry Peskov did not directly answer the question about the Crimean platform, but only stated that all the goals of "special operations will be achieved." At the same time, according to the Kremlin spokesman, Turkey's position does not prevent bilateral cooperation. In August 2022, Russian officials no longer threaten either nuclear weapons or alternative measures, since Ukraine has already been attacked, and the existing tools of pressure on European countries are already in place, and Russia has almost no capacity to increase this pressure. The emphasis of the media was focused mostly on the murder of the Russian propagandist Daria Dugina. After August 23, Russian propaganda evaluated the Crimean Platform as a minor event. The speeches of the leaders of the participating countries were interpreted as "permission to the puppet government in Kyiv to bomb Crimea." Such rhetoric was used to demonize the Ukrainian government.

Currently, the Kremlin is actively using non-military methods to put pressure on Ukraine's partner countries. In particular, these are psychological operations aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces and the top political leadership of Ukraine and nuclear blackmail, as well as energy pressure. This winter may be one of the most difficult for Europeans, high gas prices threaten to hit the economies of EU member states, lead to higher prices and bankruptcy of many enterprises. The European Union understands this and has already developed a number of strategies and adopted a number of measures aimed at reducing the harmful impact of Russian energy blackmail. In particular, a decision was made to reduce energy consumption by 15% and the "REPowerEU" plan to end dependence on Russian energy sources by 2030 was adopted. Among the measures currently being taken, it is worth noting diversification of energy sources, modernization of energy infrastructure, deconservation of coal-fired thermal power plants, return to nuclear energy, and agreements on interstate mutual assistance. As of the beginning of September, the EU has taken a fairly clear position and is still maintaining sanctions pressure with some success, despite the blackmail of the Russian Federation.


1. До кінця року армія РФ відчує снарядний голод: Insider зіставив запаси і втрати, 01.09.2022,