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Foreign Policy Research Institute

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THE COURSE OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (01.10 – 15.10.2022)

Source: Army FM  

 
  • Changes at the front

 

In the first half of October, the Armed Forces of Ukraine dealt powerful blows to the occupying forces. The main event was the attack on the Crimean bridge, probably by detonating a truck with explosives. The Crimean bridge, in addition to its symbolic significance for the Putin regime, also has a direct practical significance. Equipment and materials are supplied through it to support the enemy's southern group. Damage to this path reduces the carrying capacity of the bridge.

In response, the Russian Federation launched a massive missile attack on Ukrainian cities. The Russian Federation continues to strike critical infrastructure with ballistic missiles and drones received from Iran.

In the Luhansk direction, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continued offensive actions in the direction of the settlements of Svatove and Kreminna. 

In the Bakhmut direction, the situation remains the most difficult. This is the only direction where the enemy is gradually advancing. The city of Bakhmut is under continuous shelling, but the defense forces of Ukraine are holding their positions and restraining the Russians on the outskirts of the city.

In the Kherson direction, Ukrainian troops resumed offensive actions along the entire front line, which runs from Davydov Brid to Dudchany, after conducting concentrated artillery training of the battlefield. According to information published on social networks by the military, the attack is being carried out by mechanized units with the support of aviation: fighters and helicopters.

In the Zaporizhzhia direction, the occupier continues to set up defensive positions. The cities of the Zaporizhzhia region and the regional center are regularly bombarded with rockets.

 

  • Military assistance

 

In the first half of October, Ukraine has received the following weapons:

From Germany:

- air defense complex "IRIS-T"

- sanitary machines (36 units)

- "MARS II" anti-aircraft guns and "PzH 2000" self-propelled guns (quantity not specified)

From the USA:

- 4 HIMARS installations

From the Netherlands:

- missiles for the anti-aircraft missile complex, probably "NASAMS"

From Great Britain:

- AMRAAM missiles for air defense systems

From France:

- Caesar self-propelled gun (6 units)

From Lithuania:

- 120-mm mortars on the chassis of the M113 tracked armored personnel carrier (the number is not specified)

From Romania:

- $400,000 to the NATO special trust fund for Ukraine

From Estonia:

- winter equipment, equipment and ammunition

From Portugal:

- Ka-32A11VS transport helicopters (6 units)

From NATO:

- equipment for combating drones. In particular, hundreds of means for jamming drones

From Spain:

- Hawk anti-aircraft systems (4 units) 

Several aid packages were also announced. In particular, the package from the US for 725 million dollars provides for: additional ammunition for highly mobile HIMARS artillery missile systems; 23,000 155-mm artillery shells; 500 high-precision 155-mm artillery shells; 5,000 155-mm rounds for remote anti-tank mine (RAAM) systems; 5,000 units of anti-tank weapons; HARM aviation anti-radar missiles; more than 200 high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV); small arms and more than 2,000,000 ammunition for them; medical devices. Canada has announced an aid package that includes 500,000 units of winter clothing, cameras and drones, and $2 million to provide satellite communications.
Source: Mil.ua

 

  • Russia: internal and external challenges

 

Against the backdrop of the military successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, there is an increase in tension among the elites inside the Russian Federation. In recent months, the military leadership, the country's Ministry of Defense and directly the head of the department, Sergei Shoigu, have been severely criticized for defeats at the front. In particular, in October, the head of the private Wagner group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, publicly criticized the military command for failing to quickly respond to the aggravation of the situation. This happened against the backdrop of the de-occupation of Lyman. Ramzan Kadyrov placed responsibility for the failure in Lyman on Colonel-General Alexander Lapin. The head of Chechnya also called on the leadership of the state to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Prigozhin, in turn, continues to recruit fighters for his PMC and encourages other companies to create their own military units. PMC Wagner operates in the Bakhmut direction and, probably, this direction was not chosen by chance, because the Russians can expect at least some victories there.

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), after a video of Russian servicemen from the south complaining about logistics was circulated, a message appeared on the Wagner Telegram channel on October 14 that the Wagner leadership had decided to hand over four SUVs for 126- th coastal defense battalion in support of their efforts to hold the front line in the Kherson region. According to ISW experts, the transfer of the basic equipment for a detachment of conventional Russian ground forces may be another covert criticism of the apparent inability of the DoD to provide basic necessities for its own soldiers.

Even before that, the militant Igor Girkin, whose broadcasts are popular in Russia, was noted with sharp statements towards Russian command.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has replied on its part. The Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces appealed to Roskomnadzor with a demand to bring a number of popular bloggers in the Russian Federation to criminal liability for discrediting the RF Armed Forces. Among them were Igor Girkin, WarGonzo and Rybar. After that, information appeared about the permission for Igor Girkin to go to the front.

The conflict between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian radical wing is not a sign of an imminent rebellion in the Russian Federation. This is evidence of an attempt by the radical wing and individuals associated with the Russian power bloc to redistribute power in the Russian politicum and gain more importance. Vladimir Putin is in complete control of the situation and keeps the course of the military campaign. At the same time, competition and contradictions create cracks in the power structures, which reduces the level of control in the power structures of the Russian Federation. In Russia, the level of management at the middle level is falling, which gives Ukraine additional advantages during the Russian-Ukrainian war.