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THE COURSE OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR (01.04 – 15.04.2023)

Source: Army FM  

 
  • Changes at the front

 

Trend: A tactical and strategic balance was established along the entire
front line.

In the first half of April, there were no serious changes at the front. It can already be asserted that the Russian Federation did not achieve the goal it set in the winter and did not seize the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of the "large-scale offensive".

In the Bakhmut direction fierce battles are taking place. The situation in the city itself is dynamic, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, despite the significant efforts of the enemy, continue to defend the city center and carry out counter-attacks.

In the Avdiyivka direction, the intensity of the fighting decreased somewhat, since Russia does not have enough resources to carry out offensive actions in several directions, and therefore part of the troops were transferred from near Avdiyivka to Bakhmut. At the same time, Russian troops continue to try to surround the city from two sides. President Zelenskyy visited the city of Avdiyivka and presented awards to Ukrainian servicemen.

In the Mariinka direction, Russia is making significant efforts to advance directly within the Mariinka town, but has no significant successes.

In the Lyman direction, the enemy conducted unsuccessful offensives near the settlements of Dibrova and Bilohorivka.

In the Zaporozhzhia region, Russian troops continue to build defensive fortifications and prepare for the defense of captured territories.

 

  • Military assistance

 

Poland:

- MiG 29 fighters (8 units)

USA:

- additional ammunition for the Patriot air defense system;

- additional ammunition for HIMARS;

- 155-mm and 105-mm artillery ammunition;

- 120-mm mortar shells;

- 120-mm and 105-mm caliber tank ammunition;

- 25 mm ammunition;

- anti-tank guided missiles for ATGM TOW;

- about 400 grenade launchers and 200,000 ammunition for them;

-11 tactical vehicles for lifting equipment;

-61 refueling stations;

-10 trucks and 10 trawls for transporting heavy equipment;

- test and diagnostic equipment for maintenance and repair of vehicles; 

- spare parts and other field equipment.

Sweden:

- ATGM RBS-56

Canada:

- 21,000 assault rifles

- 38 machine guns

- more than 2.4 million cartridges

Finland:

- RAC 112 APILAS anti-tank grenade launchers

The Czech Republic also provided new military aid to Ukraine in the amount of almost 35 million dollars. The Danish Ministry of Defense concluded an agreement with Norway on the transfer of 8,000 shells for 155-mm artillery. The Rheinmetall defense concern is creating a center in Romania for the maintenance of Western military equipment used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Slovakia is negotiating with Ukraine on the joint production of ammunition, and the Polish defense industry has received an order for the purchase of 100 Rosomak armored personnel carriers. At the same time, Ukraine will receive 100 machines in the short term, and then another 100 Rosomak. Also, Poland will transfer a total of 24 Rak self-propelled mortars to Ukraine. In addition, a T-64 service center was created in Poland as part of the signed agreement between Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and the Ukrainian Ukrobronprom. Lithuania announced a new package of military support for Ukraine worth about 41 million euros, and South Korea will lease 500,000 155 mm artillery ammunition to the United States. This will allow Washington to increase the supply of shells to Ukraine. The EU also started implementing the plan to purchase ammunition for the Armed Forces.
Source: Mil.ua

 

  • Russia: internal and external challenges

 

Trend: Technology and practice of introduction of denazification of Ukrainians by Russia.

On March 29, a report authored by Dr. Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danilyuk, and Nick Reynolds was published on the website of the British think tank RUSI "Preliminary lessons from Russia's unconventional operations during the Russian-Ukrainian war, February 2022-February 2023."[1] One of the focuses of the study was Russia's strategy in relation to the civilian population. As the authors note, Once in Kyiv, the plan included three interconnected directions of operation. The first was the use of local agents to guide Russian SSO in capturing the executive and parliamentary leadership of the country. These were likely to be given show trials. The second direction was assigned to the Kadyrovtsy who had to hunt the Ukrainians believed to be organisers of patriotic resistance and those associated with the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. The third line of effort was to be the pacification of the population. This depended on the isolation of communities through the control of egress and ingress through natural choke points in civic infrastructure. Within these isolated areas, the Rosgvardia were to manage protests and acts of civil resistance. There would not necessarily need to be violent suppression of protests, but the organisers of such protests could be identified and subsequently targeted by the Kadyrovtsy.

Russia implemented this occupation plan in the occupied territories. Citizens were planned to be divided into 5 groups:

  1. Those deemed leaders of Ukrainian nationalism who were specified for physical liquidation on a high-priority target list, or for capture to enable show trials. 
  2. Those suspected of intending to support acts of resistance who needed to be recruited or suppressed including anyone associated with Ukrainian law enforcement, local government, the military or related to officials that were not actively collaborating. 
  3. Those who were deemed apathetic. 
  4. Those actively collaborating with Russian forces. 
  5. Individuals who were necessary for running critical national infrastructure and had to be controlled.

The Russians planned to remove all registers: medical, tax police, electoral, as well as registers of local authorities, insurance companies, etc. These data were necessary in order to find out who lives where and how they are related to the state. Therefore, after the seizure of the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs, the Russians immediately removed all hard drives.

Based on the experience of the war in Chechnya, the military-political command of Russia believed that in order to control Ukraine, they needed only 8% of the population to agree to cooperate. According to the assessment of the Ukrainian intelligence community, this assessment was correct and the Russians really established control over the captured territories. However, with such a low level of support from the local population, control was only possible through systematic violence.

In each village and city, the occupiers chose a building in which to organize the power headquarters. Usually it was a police station or fire department. There, the Russian military equipped, in particular, rooms for interrogations and torture. In all occupied territories, these rooms were equipped in the same way - even the devices for electric torture were the same. This example proves that the Russians prepared for torture systematically and in advance. It is worth mentioning the mobile crematoria used by the Russians at the beginning of the war. Taking into account the plan for the rapid occupation of Ukraine, it can be concluded that these mobile installations were supposed not to be used for the bodies of Russian soldiers, but to destroy the bodies of killed Ukrainians.

The number of personnel of 200,000 soldiers at the beginning of the invasion shows that the Russians were not prepared for strong resistance from the Ukrainians. The main task was to establish control over the population. This explains why in the first stages of a full-scale aggression, a significant number of the Rosguard was involved. The resistance of Ukraine and the liberation of territories saved a large number of Ukrainians from death. Currently, significant territories in the South and East of Ukraine remain under occupation. It was in the South that a system of "filtering" the population was established, and many Russian crimes remain unsolved. The lack of reaction on the part of international organizations and leading non-governmental structures to the Russian occupation system is cause for concern. It openly violates human rights and should not remain outside the attention of the international community.
 


Sources:
1. Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s Unconventional Operations During the Russo- Ukrainian War, February 2022–February 2023 Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, 29.03.2023,
URL: https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf