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Published in the "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" Surkov's claim to the political doctrine of Putin's model of Russian statehood has caused intense competition among Putin's ideologists. The first to the publication of Surkov responded the modern classic of Russian geopolitics and Russian imperialism Aleksandr Dugin, published in response his critical article entitled "Putin or Super-Putin." Dugin writes: The main mistake of Surkov is that he does not take into account that: " The present of Russia undivided belongs to the Putin, but the future, which will come immediately after him, he can not have any influence... Putin's truth is that his control does not extend to the future»[1]. Putin's mistake is that he adhered to a compromise, according to Dugin. «The current political regime in Russia, formed under Putin, is a compromise. A compromise between all the poles and the forces of the state and society. It is stable only by virtue of Putin himself, which is a compromise - between patriotism and liberalism in the economy, between Eurasianism and europeism in international politics, between conservatism and progressism in the sphere of ideas and values, between the people and the elites, between sovereignty and globalization, between the 90s and not-90s (that is, "something else"). But this compromise works as long as Putin is»[2] Dugin writes, reports "Zavtra.ru".
Thus Aleksandr Dugin states that Putin's model of the Russian state is unstable. It exists as long as there is Putin. The main question about the fate of Russia after Putin will be raised in the historical plane, not political. People who demand patriotism and social justice, will be in direct opposition to the elite, as follows from the Surkov’s article, trying to build "Putinism without Putin" which will not be possible without Putin. The situation after Putin in Russia is programmed by Putin's formula: Putin is Russia, and Russia is Putin. It is based on a combination of heritage and resources of the Russian Empire and the USSR. And in this sense, Aleksandr Dugin is wrong when he claims that Putin has not created a new model of the Russian state. Indeed, Putin restored the Russian Empire, modernizing it with new elements, giving it a new design according to the conditions of the XXI century, trying to copy the Chinese model. But the fact is that unlike the Chinese model, he put geopolitics ahead of the economy, not vice versa, as it is done in China.
But the problem of compromise is in the Russian people itself, in its values, as Aleksandr Dugin writes: patriotism and social justice. How to reach a compromise between these values, when the people want both, and the elite stands in opposite positions of cosmopolitanism and the freedom of large capital. Dugin proposes to solve this problem by introducing large-scale repression . That is to use the experience of Hitler and Stalin, but he forgets that the repression reached not only the elite, but also the people.
Dugin at the same time forgets that the Russian people by itself is a compromise between the far-fetched greatness of the Messianic mission and poverty and injustice. In this dilemma, the Russian people give priority to the first slogan: "If there was a Great Russia-the price is not important." But if Russia is Putin, then it turns out that if Putin will gone, the Russia will gone too. The way out of this dilemma A. Dugin sees in the strengthening of repression, as it was in Russian history, when Leninism was replaced by a tougher regime of Stalinism. "For elites to believe in the seriousness of the patriotic imperative," Dugin writes, as reports "Zavtra.ru", "much more extensive and systemic (and not indicative) repressions than Putin carried out are needed. "If a leader rose from the elite, who would be even more radical than Putin, and not only retained and strengthened the patriotic line, overcoming a number of unsuccessful compromises (for example, in relations with Ukraine), but also carried out reforms in the national and social spirit in domestic politics, sharp and traumatic events could be avoided. But we do not see such a person. Moreover, on its background, Putin himself will fade, and for the elites he would be a real threat this time»[3]
Therefore, in order to maintain the balance in society in the next post-Putin stage "it is necessary to start an attack on the elite, their qualitative rotation, their elimination, only this will keep the balance" according to Dugin as reports "Zavtra.ru". "If this does not happen, the collapse of statehood will begin at an accelerated pace. After all, relations with the subjects of the Federation, which have a pronounced ethnic specificity are built on Putin and his hard line in the matter of Russian sovereignty. The slightest hesitation in this matter will instantly return the situation of the 90s and again make the collapse of Russia a very likely threat. In the future, we need not Putinism, which is impossible, but something much more consistent, powerful, rich and systemic - a kind of Super-Putin, in which all his best heroic features will be continued, but his weaknesses and mistakes will be overcome," Dugin concludes.
What conclusion can we make from these reflections of Aleksandr Dugin on the future of Russia after Putin? Putin's compromise, which Aleksandr Dugin considers a disadvantage that undermines the stability of Putin's model of the state is not due to Putin's personal traits, but because objective circumstances. Putin's compromise became the realization of the lack of resources for Russia's ascent to the Olympus of the world power. Today Putin, as in the early 2000s, faces the same problem of determining the balance between global geopolitical ambitions and the resources necessary to achieve them. The Putin model of the state of the state is legitimate and still viable for Russia, because Putin's compromise is achieved by the introduction of repression and reforms, because in the minds of Russians repression against the "boyars" is the restoration of justice